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CONTRACTS - DAMAGES - GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
- GOVERNMENT NOT LIABLE FOR IMPACT DAMAGES
SUFFERED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A SUBSEQUENT
CONTRACT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY CONSTRUCTIVE
CHANGES TO A PRIOR CONTRACT. GENERAL DYNAMICS
CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
I. INTRODUCTION

In General Dynamics Corp. u. United States,! the United States
Court of Claims considered a government contractor's claim for
impact damages and rendered an opinion creating as many
questions as it answers. In the context of government contracting,
the Court of Claims defined impact damages in multiple-contract
circumstances as "the extra cost in performing one contract, caused
by the government doing things it has a right to do, respecting other
contracts."2 The court reviewed prior cases in which impact damages
have been granted in situations involving more than one contract
and, drawing on those cases, outlined the requirements that will
have to be present for future relief. A major conclusion of the opinion
was that contractors' claims for impact damages in multiplecontract situations will not be recognized except under "exceptional
circumstances."3 Another significant holding in General Dynamics
was that even extensive change ordered by the government to a
complicated weapons contract or a contract for a technologically
sophisticated product will not constitute a cardinal change or breach
of that contract. 4
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the early 1960's, the United States Navy awarded several
contracts for the construction of nuclear submarines. One of these
contracts, encompassing three submarines, was awarded to General
Dynamics Corporation. 5 Two other contracts, for one submarine
each, were awarded to Bethlehem Steel Company's Quincy, Massachusetts shipyard. 6 During the early stages of construction on
General Dynamics' three submarines, and before any construction
1. 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978).

2. Id.
3. Id. at 466.
4. Id. at 463.
5. Id. at 459.
6. Id. Bethlehem had no experience in submarine construction. The government
awarded it the contracts in order to increase the number of submarine
construction facilities. Normally, contracts are awarded by the government on a
strictly competitive basis. Here, however, the Navy invoked a national security
rationale to award Bethlehem these two contracts despite the fact that
Bethlehem was not the low bidder. There was a substantial difference in price
between General Dynamics' contract for three submarines ($59,862,606) and
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on Bethlehem's two submarines began, the Navy's lead, or model,
ship for these new submarines, the U.S.S. Thresher, sank off the
coast of New Hampshire. 7 Although the exact cause of the accident
was never determined, it was assumed that the cause of the accident
was design related. s Consequently, to preclude further disasters, the
Navy embarked on an extensive submarine redesign program given
the name "Subsafe."9 It was the "Subsafe" program and its effect on
General Dynamics' building program that led to General Dynamics'
claim for damages.
Eight months after the Thresher incident, and several months
after all of the submarine builders were aware that design changes
probably would be required by the Navy, Bethlehem closed its
Quincy shipbuilding Yard. 1o At that time, Bethlehem had not yet
begun construction on its two submarines, even though the contracts
were almost two years oldY Partially because the "Subsafe"
program was causing a backlog of work at its Groton, Connecticut
shipyard, General Dynamics purchased the Quincy yard from
Bethlehem. 12 In a separate contract, General Dynamics, Bethlehem,
and the Navy agreed that General Dynamics would assume
Bethlehem's two submarine construction contracts. 13 The Navy's
original contract with Bethlehem had contained a provision against
assignment; thus, as consideration for the Navy's waiver of its
rights against assignment, General Dynamics and Bethlehem
agreed to be bound by the standard government novation clause. As
it appeared in the contract, the novation clause read:

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.
13.

Bethlehem's contracts for one submarine each ($28,456,000 and $33,500,000). One
of the reasons for the higher costs of construction for Bethlehem was that it had
never built a submarine before this, and consequently would have had start-up
costs and higher labor costs. On the other hand, General Dynamics had long
been in the submarine construction business and could take advantage of
economies of scale. See generally General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 13885,
73-2 B.C.A. 1/10,160 (May 15, 1973).
Plaintiffs Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3) at 6; 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl.
1978).
585 F.2d at 459-60.
Id. Because at the time of the initiation of "Subsafe" the cause of the Thresher
loss was unknown, the redesign program encompassed every structural
modification that could have led to the accident.
Id. at 459. The builders were of course aware of the accident from the extensive
press coverage at the time, and were aware that one of the speculated causes of
the sinking was design defects. The Navy inquiry centered largely around
design, and the builders were active participants in these discussions.
Id. It is not clear why construction had not begun, but the delay was assuredly
caused, in part, by Bethlehem's reluctance to initiate performance on these
contracts which would have been costly and financially damaging to the already
weakened corporation. See generally General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No.
13885, 73-2 B.C.A. 1/10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,782.
585 F.2d at 459-60.
Id. at 459.
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The Transferor [Bethlehem] and the Transferee [General
Dynamics] hereby agree that the Government shall not be
obligated to payor reimburse either of them for, or otherwise
give effect to, any costs, taxes or other expenses, or any
increases therein, directly or indirectly arising out of or
resulting from (i) said assignment, conveyance and transfer,
or (ii) this Agreement, other than those which the Government, in the Absence of said assignment, conveyance and
transfer, or this Agreement, would have been obligated to
payor reimburse under the terms of the Contracts. 14
The first significant "Subsafe" change ordered by the Navy was
the requirement that the hulls of the ships be lengthened by
inserting an additional section. 15 General Dynamics realized that its
Groton shipyard would be unable to accomplish this work in a
timely fashion because other contracts were backed up at Groton. IS
General Dynamics therefore proposed to the Navy that two of the
three Groton submarines be launched and towed to its newly
acquired Quincy yard for hull lengthening. General Dynamics
informed the Navy that, because of the light work load at Quincy,
the submarines could be given top priority there. 17 In order to
expedite delivery, the Navy gave its approval.1 8 General Dynamics
never mentioned the existing Quincy ships in its transfer discussions with the Navy and never detailed any of its construction
plans. 19
"Subsafe" affected many aspects of design; as each problem was
resolved by design engineers, the government issued change orders
to the builders in piecemeal fashion.20 A few months after
transferring the Groton ships to Quincy, General Dynamics realized
that, although "Subsafe" was a year old, the program was complete
in general terms only and that many important details were yet to be
resolved. 21 As each "Subsafe" change developed, the Navy and
General Dynamics adjusted the submarine delivery dates to
accommodate the extra work required by the changes. 22 These
14. General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 13885, 73-2 B.C.A. ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973)
at 47,782.
.
15. [d. at 47,784. This change was ordered in order to strengthen the hulls.
16. 585 F.2d at 460.
17. [d.

18. [d. See also 73-2 B.C.A. ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,788-89.
19. 585 F.2d at 461.
20. See 73-2 B.C.A. ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,783-807 (outlining change order
problems).
21. [d. at 47,791.
22. [d. at 47,783-807. To illustrate the extent of the uncertainty surrounding the
"Subsafe" program, the following chart shows the number of times the parties
agreed to extend the delivery date for each of the four submarines involved. It
should be noted that only one extension of four months to each ship was
attributable to delay caused by General Dynamics. The remainder of the
extensions were to accommodate the Navy's changes.
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change orders shifting delivery dates caused disruption of General
Dynamics' construction schedule.
The nature of the work force at Quincy exacerbated the
scheduling problems caused by the "Subsafe" program. When
General Dynamics acquired the Quincy yard and transferred its
ships there from Groton, only a small number of skilled personnel
were transferred from Groton to Quincy. General Dynamics rehired
most of Bethlehem's old work force, although most of these
employees were not skilled in submarine construction. 23 The lack of
adequate workmanship and frequent errors by the Quincy crew were
well documented on each of the four ships constructed there. 24 The
two original Quincy ships suffered most in the hands of these
inexperienced workers.25 As the Navy increased the pressure on
General Dynamics to expedite delivery, the best available workers
were assigned to the two ships scheduled for earliest delivery, which
were the original Groton ships.26 Consequently, General Dynamics
had to employ additional inexperienced workers to complete the
original Quincy ships.27 General Dynamics contended that, when it
transferred the Groton ships to Quincy, it had intended to take
maximum advantage of the scheduled sequential delivery of the four
ships by effecting a "rollover" of skilled craftsmen from one ship to
another, rather than employing four separate crews. 28 According to

Ship
designation
Original
delivery date
First amended
date
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Actual
delivery

Groton (impacting)
SSN
SSN

Q,uincy (impacted)
SSN
SSN

614

615

638

649

2-9-64

6-9-64

7-30-65

6-66

5-15-65
8-15-65
11-15-65
1-8-66
3-8-66
5-15-66
8-6-66
2-25-67
5-25-67

7-15-65
10-15-65
1-15-66
3-12-66
5-12-66
7-16-66
10-8-66
11-5-66
5-20-67
7-5-67

5-30-66
8-31-66
10-26-66
1-26-67
2-11-67
3-11-67
7-11-67
10-7-67
5-68

12-26-66
2-25-67
6-3-67
7-3-67
11-3-67
2-24-68
9-68

11-16-67

1-25-68

10-27-68

3-15-68

23. Id. at 47,805.
24. Id. Specific examples were not provided in the record other than to indicate that
many things had to be redone.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28. Piaintiffs Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(h)(3) at 8-9. General
Dynamics claimed that "rollover" was a normal construction technique. In
"rollover," a contractor who has similar products to deliver in sequence trains
each employee to do a particular job. The employees then go from one item to the
next and perform the same task picking up skill and speed as they progress. The
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General Dynamics, this was its general custom, and, in addition,
because of increased efficiency and decreased cost, General Dynamics believed the Navy was chargeable with ensuring that this
"rollover" could take place. General Dynamics claimed the pressure
for expeditious delivery thwarted its "rollover" plan, resulting in
higher construction costS. 29 To the extent that General Dynamics
ever actually implemented a "rollover," it had a very limited effect.30
As a consequence of "Subsafe" and the setbacks caused by poor
workmanship, the two original Groton ships, which were transferred
to Quincy, were each delivered about three and one-half years later
than originally scheduled, and the two Quincy ships were delivered
about twenty-six months later than originally planned. 31 Because of
the increased cost of each contract, General Dynamics filed its claim
for impact damages, computed as the cost of the construction of the
Quincy submarines allegedly attributable to the massive changes
ordered to the transferred Groton submarines.
III.

CLAIMS PROCEDURES

Government contracts generally have several standard clauses
that greatly affect the rights of the parties. Of these, two played a
role in the outcome of General Dynamics - the "Changes" clause32
and the "Disputes" clause. 33 The "Changes" clause provides for
equitable adjustment of claims arising specifically under the terms
of the contract. The "Disputes" clause establishes the procedure to be
followed by the contractor in seeking compensation. The "Disputes"
clause applicable to General Dynamics' contracts required that
disputes arising within the contract first be submitted to a

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

theory is similar to the assembly line concept except that the employees move
from item to item rather than the items moving to them. The entire point of this
case is General Dynamics' contention that because of the quantity and
unpredictability of the Navy's change orders pursuant to "Subsafe," General
Dynamics was unable to implement its "rollover" plan. The problem was
aggravated by the Navy's increasing emphasis on expediting delivery of all four
ships. This led General Dynamics to hire unskilled labor to work on the impacted
submarines (Quincy submarines) while the skilled workers remained on the
impacting submarines (Groton submarines). According to General Dynamics,
because the Navy promulgated orders that defeated the "rollover" schedule, the
Navy should pay the cost of the additional labor.
73-2 B.C.A. 1110,160 at 47,789-90.
Id. at 47,805-07.
Id. at 47,792-96.
For an example of "Changes" clause, see R. NASH, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
CHANGES at 20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NASH].
The "Disputes'.' clause plays a significant role in determining which issues reach
the Court of Claims for review. See generally J. McBRIDE & H. WACHTEL,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1978) [hereinafter cited as McBRIDE & WACHTEL]'
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government contracting officer for review. 34 From an adverse
finding by the contracting officer, the contractor could appeal to the
applicable Board of Contract Appeals. 35 For all military procurement
disputes, as in General Dynamics' case, the appropriate board was
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Following
these administrative steps, the contractor's access to the courts for
review of disputes is limited. 36 Claims arising outside of the contract,
which are breach claims, were not covered by the "Disputes" clause
procedures at the time of the General Dynamics decision. 37
Congress enacted the Wunderlich Act38 in 1954 in response to
two United States Supreme Court decisions that gave a large
measure of finality to findings of fact and law by government

34. See Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 401 (1878) (the purpose of the
"Disputes" clause is to provide a quick, effective administrative remedy and to
avoid "vexatious and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes, ruinous
litigation. ").
35. There are eleven active Boards of Contract Appeals. When a contractor wishes to
appeal a decision of a contracting officer, the appeal will either be entertained by
the Board of the agency with which the contract has been made or, if the agency
has no Board, the head of the agency will refer the case to one of the existing
Boards. See Joseph, A Primer on Remedies, in RISKS AND REMEDIES IN
GoVERNMENT CONTRACTING 31 (1974) (a conference sponsored by the A.B.A.); R.
NASH & J. CIBNIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT 859-80 (2d ed. 1969). See also United
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1966) (Court of
Claims has limited jurisdiction to review the Board's decisions of claims arising
under the contract provisions).
36. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1966).
37. The Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978),
modifies the procedural aspects of contract disputes significantly. The actual
impact of the changes caused by this new act is unsettled and beyond the scope
of this casenote.
38. Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (1976).
The Wunderlich Act provided that administrative decisions were to be final
only with respect to findings of fact. The two sections of the Wunderlich Act
provide as follows:
§ 321. Limitation on pleading contract-provisions relating to
finality; standards of review.
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating
to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any
department or agency 'or his duly authorized representative or board in a
dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be
pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of
any such decision to cases where fraud by such' official or his said
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such
decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.
§ 322. Contract-provisions making decisions final on questions of
Law.
No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a
question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.
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administrative Boards of Contract Appeals. 39 The Wunderlich Act
. provides that f'mdings of fact by Boards of Contract Appeals are
given finality, unless they are judicially determined to be fraudulent,
capricious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith, or
not supported by substantial evidence. 4o Under the Act, findings of
law by Boards of Contract Appeals are no longer given finality and
are completely reviewable by the courts. 41 Despite the passage of the
Wunderlich Act, the Supreme Court has interpreted it so that review
by the Court of Claims of a Board of Contract Appeals decision on
an issue of law nonetheless remains limited in scope. 42
IV. THE GENERAL DYNAMICS DECISIONS

A.

The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals Decision

General Dynamics, pursuant to the "Disputes" clause in its
assigned Quincy contract, filed a claim against the government for
the increased costs of performance on the Quincy contracts. 43 The
thrust of the claim was that the "Subsafe" changes ordered by the
Navy to the Groton ships were so extensive that they interfered
with General Dynamics' planned personnel "rollover" from the
Groton to the Quincy ships.44 This allegedly forced General
Dynamics to use untrained and inadequate labor on the Quincy
ships, resulting in higher construction costs. General Dynamics
claimed that the changes to the Groton or "impacting" contract were
so significant as to constitute a constructive change of the
"impacted" or Quincy contract.
A constructive change to a contract, as opposed to a cardinal
change, is any act or requirement of the contracting agency, other
than a formal change order as provided for by the contract, that
requires the contractor to perform work different from that specified
39. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); United States v. Moorman, 338
U.S. 457 (1950). The Court held in Moorman that administrative decisions in
contracts disputes were "final and binding." 338 U.S. at 463. In Wunderlich, the
Court further held that administrative decisions could be overturned by a court
only if there were a determination of fraud in'the rendering of the administrative
decision. 342 U.S. at 99.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972) (government
has no right to appeal adverse decisions of boards of appeal); United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (Board findings of fact are final
in subsequent breach claims under the same contract); United States v. Carlo
Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963) (review of board decisions is limited to the
record); Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co. v. United States 499 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (the
government may appeal only those aspects of the case that the contractor has
appealed and is estopped from raising other issues). See also Pasley, The S & E
Contractors Case-Beheading the Hydra or Wreaking Devasation?, 1973 DUKE
L.J. 1.
43. 585 F.2d at 460-61.
44. Id. at 461.
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under the original contract. 45 A constructive change may entitle the
contractor to price and performance adjustments. Unlike in a formal change, however, in which the government admits responsibility
for the cost and performance adjustment, the government does not
always openly admit in a constructive change situation that the
contractor is entitled to a revision of the contract terms. 46 Constructive changes typically come about informally or piecemeal, and the
word "change" is not often used by the parties when a constructive
change is occurring. Often, the parties do not recognize until after
the fact that the contract has been changed to the extent that the
contractor is entitled to additional compensation. Whether or not a
constructive change entitles the contractor to equitable adjustment
is a question of fact. A contractor, however, may not refuse to
perform a change that amounts to a constructive change. 47
Unsettled claims for equitable adjustment arising from constructive
changes are resolved pursuant to the "Disputes" clause of the
contract. 48
A cardinal change, in distinction to a constructive change, is an
order that, because of its scope, exceeds the changes permissable
under a "Changes" clause and is considered a breach of the
contract. 49 Because a cardinal change constitutes a breach, a
contractor may refuse to perform the change. 50 The very magnitude
of many government contracts causes difficulties in identifying
when a specific change constitutes a breach and, worse yet for the
contractor if he refuses to perform, whether the government may
assert a breach. 51 A contractor generally will perform a change that
it believes is a cardinal change, but will reserve its right to litigate
the alleged breach by notifying the contracting officer of its intent to
seek relief. 52 Because a cardinal charge is a breach of the contract,
the contract's "Changes" and "Disputes" clauses are inapplicable.
General Dynamics could have pursued its breach claim directly in
the Court of Claims without first resorting to formal administrative
45. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PuBLIC
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 90 (1977); NASH, supra note 32, at 203. Formal change
orders typically are evidenced by written orders to modify the contract as
originally written. Formal change orders are provided for by the contract in the
"Changes" clause which specifies the procedures to be followed when ordering a
change in the contract and also outlines the contract price and performance
adjustment procedure to be followed by the parties. See note 33 supra.
46. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 90 (1977).
47. Stoeckert v. United States, 391 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
48. See note 34 supra.
49. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 88 (1977).
50. Gilbert W. Savage, ASBCA No. 11090, 66-2 B.C.A. ~ 5832 (1966).
51. Axel Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 18990,74-1 B.C.A. ~ 10,471 (1974).
52. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 88 (1977).
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procedures. 53 Unsure of whether its claim was a constructive change
under the contract or a cardinal change, General Dynamics decided
to pursue successive claims, first pursuing its administrative remedy
for a constructive change with the Navy's contracting officer and
then the ASBCA. If the administrative route proved unsuccessful,
General Dynamics could then file a breach claim in the Court of
Claims, and also appeal to that court the administrative decision on
the constructive change claim.
The Navy's contracting officer rejected the constructive change
claim. General Dynamics appealed the adverse decision to the
ASBCA on two alternative theories of recovery.54 General Dynamics
first asserted that the changes ordered to the Groton submarines
impacted the performance of the Quincy submarine contracts to the
extent that the changes to the Groton contract constructively
changed the Quincy contracts. This claim will be referred to as the
multiple-contract impact claim. Second, General Dynamics asserted
that the novation clause amounted to an amalgamation of the
separate contracts into one entitling the contractor to equitable
adjustment. This claim will be referred to as the one-contract impact
claim. More substantial precedent exists for allowing one-contract
claims than multiple-contract claims. 55
The ASBCA findings of fact included a determination that there
was no submarine construction plan at the time of the transfer, and
therefore, that the Navy had no reason to know of any such plan.
The Board also found that General Dynamics transferred the
impacting ships for its own benefit to relieve congestion at Groton
and that the damage claimed was the result of this transfer. General
Dynamics was also charged with the knowledge that "subsafe" was
forseeably complex and incomplete at the time of the transfer. The
ASBCA additionally found that the Navy had not interfered in any
way with General Dynamics' performance. 56
On the issues of law with respect to the multiple-contract impact
claim, the ASBCA held that the changes to the Groton (impacting)
contract did not amount to a constructive change to the Quincy
(impacted) contract, stating:

53. Id. at 274. But see note 36 supra. The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 provides that
all claims, including those for breach of contract based upon an alleged cardinal
change, must be presented first to the contracting officer. Contractors are no
longer able to raise breach claims initially in court. Contract Disputes Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563 §§ 6-8, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978).
54. 73-2 B.CA ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,780.
55. See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d 431, 432 (Ct.
Cl. 1970), Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
56. 73-2 B.CA ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,807-08.
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Absent unusual and extreme factual circumstance, the
ordinary rule is that the proper exercise of one's legal rights,
such as [the Navy's] right to make changes under [the
Groton contract], does not give rise to relief even when this
lawful exercise of one person's right causes an economic loss
to another.57
According to the ASBCA, because the Groton contracts contained
"Changes" clauses, the Navy was free to issue changes as necessary,
provided that General Dynamics was equitably compensated as
required by the "Changes" clause. The ASBCA also rejected General
Dynamics' one-contract impact claim because the language of the
novation clause released the Navy from any liability for costs
arising from the contract assignment between Bethlehem and
General Dynamics. 58 The ASBCA did not directly answer the
question whether the clause created a single new contract.

B.

The Court of Claims Decision

General Dynamics appealed to the Court of Claims in two
alternative counts. The first, a breach claim invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, alleged a cardinal change. 59 In
the second, General Dynamics requested Wunderlich review of the
ASBCA decision, alleging that the Board's decision was not
supported by substantial evidence. 60
.
Generally, in determining whether a change is a cardinal
change, the course of performance must be examined by measuring
the number and quality of ordered changes and their effect on the
entire contract. At a certain point, the extent of changes amounts to
a breach.sl Under the facts of General Dynamics, however, the court
held that this test was inapplicable. It reasoned that the nature of
the goods contracted for - technologically sophisticated warships
necessary to the national defense - and the recent U.S.S. Thresher
tragedy, which demonstrated the necessity for design modifications,
justified the changes so long as they did not constitute an abuse of
governmental discretion. Inasmuch as no such abuse was found, the
court granted summary judgment for the government on the
cardinal change claim.

57. Id. at 47.808.
58. Id. at 47,809. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.

59. 585 F.2d at 462. See also Plaintiff's Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3)
at 2.
60 ..585 F.2d at 464. See also Plaintiff's Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3)
at 2.
61. 585 F.2d at 462.
62. Id. at 464. In its decision, the court never clearly identified the counts in General
Dynamics' claim.
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In the Wunderlich review claim, General Dynamics alleged that
the changes to the Groton contract amounted to a constructive
change of the Quincy contract for which it should receive equitable
adjustment. 62 General Dynamics claimed that the ASBCA made
errors of law in holding that the government was not liable for the
increased costs of constructing the Quincy ships and that the
novation agreement barred recovery of those increased costs.
General Dynamics also alleged error in the ASBCA's findings that
General Dynamics, by creating the situation resulting in the
increased costs, assumed the risk of cost overruns, and that General
Dynamics should not have relied on the government's representations in early 1964 that the "Subsafe" program was complete. Errors
of mixed law and fact were alleged in the findings that the
submarine "rollover" plan did not exist, that the Navy did not
interfere with General Dynamics' planned performance, and that the
Navy did not subordinate performance of the Quincy (impacted)
contracts to the Groton (impacting) contract. 63
The Court of Claims held that, even accepting the existence of
the alleged "rollover" plan, General Dynamics was not entitled to
relief. 64 The court found, as had the ASBCA, that the "rollover" plan
was never communicated to the Navy and that the Navy never
performed any act acknowledging the existence of a construction
plan. 65 It also found that the Navy never waived its right to make
changes as provided in the contracts. The government possessed a
right to modify the contract unilaterally, and the Navy's approval of
the transfer to Quincy, according to the court, neither expressly nor
impliedly waived this right. Without addressing the issue of whether
the novation clause created a single new contract, the court held that
the Navy was liable only for normally compensable contract
changes as set out in the "Changes" clause. 66 In addition, the court
stated that the manner of deployment of the available labor pool was
entirely General Dynamics' decision. It also found that the Navy did
not order any specific manner of utilizing the work force. While

63. See Plaintiffs Request For Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3) at 12-13. General
Dynamics claimed that the following findings of fact by the ASBCA were
actually issues of law or mixed fact and law: that General Dynamics created the
impact by its assumption of the Quincy contracts and by the transfer of the
Groton ships, thereby assuming the risk of increased costs; that General
Dynamics could not reasonably have relied on assertions by the Navy in early
1964 that the "Subsafe" program was complete; that General Dynamics had no
"rollover" plan; that the Navy did not interfere with any plan; and that the Navy
did not order General Dynamics to subordinate performance of the Quincy
contracts to the Groton contract. See also Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment Pursuant to Trial Judge's Order Under Rule 165(b) at 6-8.
64. 585 F.2d at 464.
65. [d.
66. [d.
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acknowledging that when changes lead to disruption, extra work, or
new procedures in performance, the contractor is entitled to
equitable adjustment, the court severely limited such an adjustment
in situations involving more than one contract. 67 Prior case law
granting equitable adjustment was referred to by the court, but in
each such case relief had been sought upon a single contract. 68
Specifically, the court stated that had this been one contract instead
of three, General Dynamics probably would have been able to obtain
equitable adjustment. 69 At this point, the court could have denied
General Dynamics' relief on the second claim and concluded its
opinion.
The court further addressed the concept of impact damages in
multiple-contract situations, however, and delineated in dicta the
applicable criteria for relief in future multiple-contract impact damages claims.70 It stated that "exceptional circumstances" must be
present to justify an equitable adjustment for increased costs in the
performance of one contract caused by rightful government conduct
under other contracts. The government's refusal to adjust the
contract price must be inequitable to the contractor. The court
outlined some situations in which relief might be warranted, such as
when the government conceals facts from the contractor that are
necessary to formulate costs, or intentionally hinders the contractor's performance, and "perhaps other instances where some degree
of government culpability and 'proximate cause' exist."7l Because
the actions of primary importance in General Dynamics (the
novation, transfer, and use of the labor force) were found to be
General Dynamics' own management choices and not caused by the

67. Id. at 465. See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d
431 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (unreasonable delay by Government causing contractor to
encounter additional construction costs); Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. United States,
406 F.2d 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (contractor incurred additional labor costs in
constructing a dam due to changed conditions).
68. See note 55 supra.
69. 585 F.2d at 465.
70. Although the court never acknowledged the fact in its opinion, the claim for
impact damages under circumstances involving separate contracts with the
claim being made under the first contract was one of first impression. As
discussed by the court in its opinion, most prior cases dealt with claims arising
within one contract. Id. at 465-66. In United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942),
the Supreme Court set the test for recovery for impact, delay, indirect, or ripple
costs. The Court held that the government was required to adjust price only for
the changed work and not for unchanged work. For a discussion of an
alternative to this doctrine, see Roesler, Recovery of Impact Costs Under the Pre1968 Changed Conditions Clause, 31 FED. B.J. 327 (1972) (Under the test for
recovery proposed in this article, General Dynamics might have recovered
because the proposed standard does not require forseeability.). Since the
modification of the "Changes" clause in 1968, the continued validity of the Rice
criteria may be questionable.
71. 585 F.2d at 466.

1979]

General Dynamics Corp. v. U.S.

173

government, the court held that the multiple-contract impact criteria
were not satisfied. 72
The court concluded its opinion by returning to the novation
clause, as had both the ASBCA and the trial judge. By its terms, the
novation clause precluded government liability for costs arising
directly or indirectly from the assignment of the Quincy contracts.
Both of the lower decisions relied heavily upon this clause to deny
relief by making their rulings on the effect of the novation
agreement dispositive of the case. The Court of Claims, however,
skirted General Dynamics' assertion that the novation created a
single new contract. In fact, the import of the novation agreement
was not addressed because the court found other grounds dispositive
of the case. 73
V. ANALYSIS

General Dynamics presented the Court of Claims with an
opportunity to clarify the law of multiple-contract impact damage
claims based upon constructive change. While the court did
articulate a test - "exceptional circumstances" are required if such
a claim is to be successful - that test is so imprecise that it offers
little in the way of objective standards by which a contractor can
ascertain whether the government's actions might make possible a
viable multiple-contract impact claim. In applying this test to the
General Dynamics facts, the court found that the requisite exceptional circumstances did not exist. Moreover, the court noted that the
actions of General Dynamics itself contributed to the cost overruns. 74
Stated alternatively, the court did not find in General Dynamics the
"government culpability and proximate cause" that had been
present in prior cases in which multiple-contract impact damage
claims had been successful.
The Court of Claims did make clear, however, that changes to
government weapon systems contracts and contracts for technologically sophisticated equipment can never amount to cardinal
changes. 75 In denying General Dynamics' claim, the court noted the
calamitous nature of the Thresher incident and the relation of that
incident to the safety of submarine crews and to the national
interest. 76 The court also noted that advanced submarine design is
on the fringe of technological development and that a contractor
could not, therefore, reasonably expect to complete a construction
program without many changes reflecting technological break-

72.Id.
73.Id.
74. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
75. 585 F.2d at 462-64.
76.Id.
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throughs. 77 The conclusion can thus be made that contracts to build
combat ships, fighter planes, tanks, cannons, and perhaps even
rifles might fall within the scope of the reasoning of the General
Dynamics court. Conversely, it is also clear that contracts to produce
non-dangerous objects of ordinary manufacture would be subject to
cardinal changes. 78 The problem with the court's rule, however, is
that a clear line cannot be drawn between contracts that can be
cardinally changed and those that can not. Defense materials
contractors should realize that at any given moment an item
destined for military use, no matter how mundane, could be vital. In
such an instance, would the government escape liability for
extensive changes to such contracts? The General Dynamics opinion
does not answer this question.
In disposing of the cardinal change claim, the Court of Claims
provided possible criteria for the successful pursuit of such a claim. 79
The court stated that the tests for cardinal change are the numbers
of changes, the number of components changed and unchanged, the
nature and timing of the changes, and the work necessary for the
contractor to incorporate the changes. so The court implied that
General Dynamics had satisfied these requirements, but failed
nevertheless because of the nature of the object of the contract. 81
Cardinal change law therefore has been somewhat clarified.
Contractors should look to the nature of the items being produced by
them to determine whether the items may be of a nature that would
allow changes amounting to a complete redesign not to be
recognized as cardinal. Certainly, submarines fall within this
class. 82
The court's decision on General Dynamics' constructive change
claim appears to be result oriented. The dichotomy set up by the
court between possible relief under one set of criteria in a singlecontract setting,83 and no relief under a different set of criteria in a
multiple-contract setting,84 emphasizes form over substance. Moreover, the Court of Claims told General Dynamics that its claim

77. Id. at 463.
78. Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, 408 F.2d 1030 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (this case,
however, was settled, thus its precedential value is limited). See 585 F.2d at
463-64.
79. 585 F.2d at 462-64.
BO. Id. See also Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, 408 F.2d 1030 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
81. 585 F.2d at 462-63.
82. Id. Accord, McCord v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 155 (1873), aff'd sub nom.
Chouteau v. United States, 95 U.S. 61 (1877) (manufacturers of civil war
Monitors held unable to assert a cardinal change no matter how extensive
government changes may be).
83. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
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might have been successful had it been brought under one contract,
but failed to rule on General Dynamics' claim that the novation
merged the three contracts into one. Without resolution of that issue,
General Dynamics was left with only its multiple-contract impact
claim. The court applied different criteria to the multiple-contract
impact claim, and held that General Dynamics did not satisfy those
requirements. General Dynamics, therefore, was left with a wrong
without a remedy.
It is in the analysis of constructive change in multiple-contract
impact claims that the General Dynamics opinion creates the most
confusion. Even though the claim in General Dynamics was based
upon contract law, the court's analysis was couched in terms of tort
principles. Initially, the court examined the nature of the assent to
transfer the submarines and construed its contractual effect in the
Navy's favor. 85 This conclusion was based upon the general legal
principle that the assent did not on its face purport to witness the
Navy's deference to General Dynamics' labor plans, nor did it waive
the Navy's right to make the extensive changes the court found
permissable in its cardinal change analysis. 86 In the remainder of its
discussion, however, the court pointed out that it was General
Dynamics that managed the work force. The blame, therefore, for
costs attributable to work force utilization was solely the contractor's.87 This reasoning seems to stem from a proximate causecontributory negligence approach. What General Dynamics was
seeking in its constructive change claim was an equitable adjustment to the contract price. Equity requires that the contractor have
clean hands. General Dynamics did not qualify because, even if the
"Subsafe" changes affected its "rollover" plan, General Dynamics
exacerbated those effects by its own poor management. In other
words, General Dynamics' own management choices were the
proximate cause of its damages.
The court's approach to impact damages in multiple-contract
situations has further basis in tort law. The court construed a
number of prior cases in which claims were based upon changes
of one contract impacting another.88 The court's conclusion, which
appears sound, is that "only in exceptional circumstances can an
equitable adjustment be made for extra cost in performing one
contract, caused by the government doing things it has a right to do,

85. 585 F.2d at 464.
86.Id.
87. Id. at 465.
88. Id. at 465-66. See generally United States v. Beuttas, 324 U.S. 768 (1945); Allied
Paint Mfg. Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1972); J.A. Jones Constr.
Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Amino Bros. Co. v. United
States, 372 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967); Specialty
Assembling & Packing Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 554 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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respecting other contracts."89 The examples set forth by the court all
amount to conduct on the part of the government that is tantamount
to malicious interference with the contractor's business. For
example, equitable adjustment may be allowed were the government
knowingly to withhold information from the contractor that the
contractor needs to estimate his costs,90 or were the government
knowingly ·and intentionally to hinder the contractor's performance. 91 Most interesting for future cases is the statement of the
General Dynamics court in summary that the government would be
liable were both government culpability and proximate cause to
exist. 92 Proximate cause is not a contract principle. Perhaps what
the court said, in essence, is that in order for impact damages to be
awarded in an equitable price adjustment, the government must
commit a tort on the contractual relationship. This government
wrong must be the proximate cause of the contractor's increased
costs outside of the contract, and the contractor must do nothing
that contributes to that increased cost. More simply stated, if the
government commits an intentional tort, it may have a defense
when the contractor is contributorily negligent.
It appears that the court wanted to eliminate claims for impact
damages, yet decided in light of prior cases 93 to leave the door open
ever so· slightly for a future plaintiff presenting a case with the
proper facts. Slight changes in the facts might have resulted in
General Dynamics prevailing on its claims. Had the Navy been
informed of the "rollover" plans, General Dynamics might have met
the "exceptional circumstances" test, inasmuch as change orders
that disrupted that plan might have been viewed as tantamount to
"government culpability and 'proximate cause.' "94 Similarly, were
General Dynamics building cargo vessels of routine design, the
cardinal change claim probably would have been successful.
The decision of the ASBCA in Ingalls Shipbuilding Division,
Litton Systems, Inc.,95 a companion case to General Dynamics that
never reached the Court of Claims, highlights the iinportance of
General Dynamics' "contributory negligence." Litton filed an impact
damages claim for increased costs in performing seven contracts
(five Navy surface, and fourteen commercial vessels) allegedly
resulting from "Subsafe" changes of Litton's contracts to build three
submarines. 96 Litton claimed the increased costs were due to the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

585 F.2d at 466.
[d.
[d.
[d.
See note 88 supra.
585 F.2d at 466.
ASBCA No. 17579, 78-1 B.C.A.
[d. at 63,583.

~

13,038 (February 17, 1978).
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Navy's insistence that it give priority to the construction of the
submarines. 97 Litton was decided by the ASBCA eight months
before the Court of Claims issued its opinion in General Dynamics.
In Litton, the plaintiff contractor did not make any claims under the
"Changes" clause to its contract, which distinguishes the case at
least superficially from General Dynamics. 98 The ASBCA held for
the contractor and awarded damages for an injury similar to that
which General Dynamics had suffered. The ASBCA distinguished
its decisions in Litton and General Dynamics on the grounds that
General Dynamics had contributed to its own loss because of its
management decision to move the ships. The Board also noted that
in General Dynamics the plain language of the novation clause
barred recovery.99 It is not clear whether the ASBCA decision in
Litton is good law due to the subsequent Court of Claims decision in
General Dynamics. It is interesting to note, however, that the
ASBCA implies in clearer terms than the Court of Claims that
General Dynamics came close to recovery. The Litton decision
implies that the requisite government inequity was present in
General Dynamics, but that the contractor's own mismanagement
broke the chain of proximate cause. lOO
VI. CONCLUSION
In General Dynamics, the Court of Claims reached three major
conclusions. With respect to cardinal change law, the court held that
contracts for technologically sophisticated items, for items that can
endanger human safety if poorly designed, and perhaps for weapons
systems in general, can be modified extensively by the government
without running the risk of committing a cardinal change. Under
the category of constructive change, the court made two rulings.
Regarding one-contract impact damage claims, the court reaffirmed
prior case law by approving equitable adjustment of the contract
price in such situations. It stated that General Dynamics might have

97. Id. Litton filed its claim under the "Suspension of Work" clause in its contract as
a constructive suspension of work. The difference between this clause and the
changes clause is not relevant to this note. For additional information on
"Suspension of Work" clauses, see California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC
TECHNIQUES OF PUBUC CONTRACTS PRACTICE 90 (1977).
98. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
99. 78-1 B.C.A. ~ 13,038, at 63,659.
100. See notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra.
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been entitled to adjustment if its claim had been brought under a
single contract. In multiple-contract cases, the court pulled together
criteria that may be used to determine whether "exceptional
circumstances" exist that justify recovery by the contractor. It held
that General Dynamics did not have a cognizable claim under these
multiple-contract criteria. In summary, the court implicitly found
that General Dynamics was "wronged" in its contractual relationship but could find no theory under which General Dynamics could
obtain relief.
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